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HOW UNDERSTANDING THE NATURE OF
CORPORATE NORMS CAN PREVENT THEIR
DESTRUCTION BY SETTLEMENTS
JAMES D. COX†
ABSTRACT
Scholars have long celebrated the importance of norms in corporate
law. Indeed, norms likely guide corporate actors more than the
omnipresent threat of shareholder suits. This Article divides corporate
norms into two distinct groups: aspirational norms and arbiter norms.
Aspirational norms announce socially desirable objectives for
corporate managers and encourage certain disclosure practices; arbiter
norms identify distinct transactions for closer scrutiny by an
independent body, the court. This Article shows that even though
aspirational norms and arbiter norms serve different objectives, they
share a common characteristic—overbreadth. This feature exists
whether the norm is set forth by statute or found in judicial doctrine.
Such overbreadth explains some, but by no means all, of the problems
accompanying shareholder litigation, including the frequency of suits
and inconsequential settlements. This Article also develops the
paradoxes that accompany corporate norms.
The inherent overbreadth of both aspirational and arbiter norms
can be of great assistance to their protection against inconsequential
settlements. Using the recent decision In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder
Litigation, this Article addresses how courts can fulfill their role in the
non-adversarial setting of the settlement hearing. When asked to
approve a settlement, the court should anchor its scrutiny of the
adequacy and reasonableness of a settlement in the norm that is central
to the suit. By doing so, the court can more positively contribute to the
ongoing development of corporate norms.

INTRODUCTION
We are now in the fifth decade of lamenting our litigious society;
critics claim we are in the grips of a self-interested legal profession that
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feeds itself on the rising tide of litigation, profiting lavishly by both the
prosecution and defense of baseless suits.1 Even though this is a
proposition that is hotly debated, a variety of legal reforms have
nonetheless been founded on the idea that there are too many suits
brought in every imaginable arena.2
Beginning in 1973, judges and academics raised attention—
indeed, alarm—regarding the litigiousness of American society based
on the perceived explosion of civil litigation that was burying the
courts.3 For the next fifty years there was concern that the demand for
justice was growing at a faster pace than society’s willingness to provide
resources to meet the rising demand. There are multiple causes of the
increase in suits, including the explosion of rights created by courts and
legislatures; the concomitant rise in expectations fed by law reform
efforts throughout the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s; the growing attention
that the media has accorded the law; the explosive growth in the
number of lawyers (and their newly recognized freedom to advertise);
and the ability to vindicate mass torts such as asbestos and intrauterinedevice claims.4 Court backlogs grew visibly, as did the cries that too
1. For an early claim of excessive civil litigation, see Maurice Rosenberg, Let’s Everybody
Litigate?, 50 TEX. L. REV. 1349, 1349–51 (1972). Even a former vice president boldly embraced
the view of the country being overtaken by an avalanche of litigation. See Dan Quayle, Civil
Justice Reform, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 559, 560 (1992) (“Few would dispute the proposition that
America has become a litigious society . . . .”). For a critical analysis of the data on which the
litigiousness claims are based, see WILLIAM HALTOM & MICHAEL MCCANN, DISTORTING THE
LAW: POLITICS, MEDIA, AND THE LITIGATION CRISIS 73–109 (2004); see also Marc Galanter,
Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don’t Know (and Think We Know)
About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4, 69–71 (1983)
(combatting the “litigation explosion” theory and instead arguing that the rise in litigation is “an
adaptive (but not necessarily optimal) response to a set of changing conditions”).
2. See, e.g., Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, §§ 2, 4, 119 Stat. 4, 4–5, 10
(amending 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1339(d), 1453, 1711–15) (granting federal courts jurisdiction over
class action suits in which at least one hundred plaintiffs seek damages in excess of $5 million, and
calling for closer review of settlements, as part of a tort reform effort sparked by concerns about
abuses within the state judicial system); Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub.
L. No. 105-353, § 2, 112 Stat. 3227, 3227 (amending scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (authorizing
the removal of class actions to federal court in certain securities contexts, so as to prevent
plaintiffs from avoiding the restrictions introduced by the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act); Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 101, 109 Stat. 737,
737–43 (codified as amended in 15 U.S.C.) (adding provisions directed to the prosecution of
securities fraud claims).
3. See, e.g., HENRY J. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 20–23 (1973)
(discussing a range of social, legislative, and judicial developments contributing to a significant
increase in cases before the federal courts); John H. Barton, Behind the Legal Explosion, 27 STAN.
L. REV. 567, 567 (1975) (discussing the recent “legal explosion” and growth in caseloads).
4. See Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the “Litigation Explosion,”
“Litigation Crisis,” and Efficiency Clichés Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial
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many complaints found their way into the courts. Leading
commentators, such as Professors Arthur Miller and Marc Galanter,
have produced substantial scholarship and supporting data
demonstrating that the litigation explosion is more myth than reality.5
Nonetheless, the image of a litigation explosion continues today.
Corporate law is very much a part of, if not now central to, the
litigation-explosion debate. Congress addressed a rather narrow corner
of the litigation spectrum—securities fraud suits, particularly those
maintained as class actions—with the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA).6 The hearings leading up to the passage
of the PSLRA,7 and the committee report accompanying the final
version of the legislation,8 are replete with calls to winnow the number
of securities fraud suits. Unlike other areas in which congressional
action produced few observable impacts, the PSLRA changed the
landscape dramatically. For example, in just a few years following the
passage of the PSLRA, the rate at which defendants prevailed on
motions to dismiss in securities class actions nearly doubled.9
Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982, 989–92 (2003) (identifying these and other reasons for the
salience the litigation-explosion charge enjoys).
5. Professor Miller observes that despite the U.S. litigation rate increasing since the 1950s,
the rate is “not higher than it has been during other periods of American history, and, per capita,
is in the same range as other industrialized countries’ rates.” Id. at 993–94 (footnote omitted).
Professor Galanter observes that growth in case filings can be the result of unique developments;
for example, he reports that 75 percent of the cases between 1975 and 1985 were explained by five
categories that included prisoner petitions, social security, and civil rights cases. Marc Galanter,
The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REV. 3, 17 (1986). His point is that the clustering
of cases occurs over time and reflects not a societal predisposition to litigation, but rather the
“ebb-and-flow” societal forces and developments that produce injuries and claims for redress. Id.
at 28. For example, more than a quarter of the tort filings (one of the five categories he identified
as driving most of the increase in filings) were prompted by the publicity of the harms of asbestos
and the approaching expiration of the statute of limitations. Id. at 24.
6. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
7. See, e.g., Securities Litigation Reform: Hearings Before the H. Subcomm. on Telecomm.
and Fin. of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103d Cong. at 18 (1994) (statement of Hon.
Ralph Hall); Private Litigation Under the Federal Securities Laws: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Secs. of the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 103d Cong. at 2 (1993)
(statement of Sen. Chris Dodd); STAFF OF S. SUBCOMM. ON SECS. OF THE COMM. ON BANKING,
HOUSING & URBAN AFFAIRS, 103D CONG., REP. ON PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION (May 17,
1994).
8. See generally H.R. REP. NO. 104-369 (1995) (Conf. Rep.) (discussing the inclusion of
numerous sections intended for the “reduction of abusive litigation”).
9. Compare RONALD I. MILLER, TODD FOSTER & ELAINE BUCKBERG, NERA ECON.
CONSULTING, RECENT TRENDS IN SHAREHOLDER CLASS ACTION LITIGATION: BEYOND THE
MEGA-SETTLEMENTS, IS STABILIZATION AHEAD? 4 (2006), http://www.nera.com/content/dam/
nera/publications/archive1/BRO_RecentTrends2006_SEC979_PPB-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.
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But not all efforts to reduce the frequency of corporate litigation
are legislative. The Supreme Court has weighed in mightily to reduce
the scope of the fraud provisions of the Securities Act10 and the
Securities Exchange Act,11 and has justified the resulting standard as a
means of reducing the frequency of litigation.
Most recently, the litigation-explosion debate has centered on
state-based litigation in connection with mergers and acquisitions
transactions.12 Most noticeable in this area are the dramatic changes in
corporate deal litigation. Consider that from 1999 to 2000 only 12
percent of deals involved litigation, and most of the deal litigation not
only involved Delaware firms but also took place in Delaware.13 Suits
were consequential then, because firms that were sued experienced a
statistically significant higher incidence of deals that did not close, and
deals that did close yielded their shareholders increased returns.
Hence, the deal-focused suits in that former era could be seen, on the
whole, as positive.14
However, at the beginning of this decade, the frequency and
composition of deal-focused litigation dramatically changed. For
example, Matthew Cain and Professor Steven Davidoff Solomon
report that in 2012, there were 121 transactions worth over $100
cc/N9BM-BWFQ] (reporting a dismissal rate of 40.3 percent for securities class actions filed from
1998 to 2003), with ELAINE BUCKBERG, TODD FOSTER & RONALD I. MILLER, NERA ECON.
CONSULTING, RECENT TRENDS IN SHAREHOLDER CLASS ACTION LITIGATION: ARE
WORLDCOM AND ENRON THE NEW STANDARD? 3 (2005), http://www.nera.com/content/
dam/nera/publications/archive1/Recent_Trends_07.2005.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6ZRK-6KEQ]
(reporting a dismissal rate of 20.3 percent for securities class actions filed from 1991 to 1995).
10. Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 583–84 (1995) (narrowing the scope of Securities
Act section 12(a)(2) to public offers that are registered or that are public in nature but qualify for
an exemption from registration); Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 654–55 (1988) (limiting defendants
under Securities Act section 12 to those who transfer title or solicit for financial gain).
11. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Sci.-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 158–63 (2008)
(explaining that if one actively participates in a scheme to defraud, but does not make the
document that misled the plaintiff, there is no violation of the antifraud provision); Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 731–55 (1975) (limiting standing under the antifraud
provision to those who purchase or sell in connection with the fraud).
12. Indeed, within the long shadow of securities litigation, we find seemingly parasitic
tagalong derivative suits that seek relief based on failures of oversight on the part of the board of
directors of companies settling securities fraud suits, in which plaintiffs allege that various lapses
contributed to the misrepresentations that gave rise to the securities violation. See Stephen J.
Choi, Jessica Erickson & Adam C. Pritchard, Piling On? An Empirical Study of Parallel
Derivative Suits 2–4 (NYU Law and Econ. Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 16-05,
2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2703509 [https://perma.cc/Z4QV-WGJ8].
13. C.N.V. Krishnan, Ronald W. Masulis, Randall S. Thomas & Robert B. Thompson,
Shareholder Litigation in Mergers and Acquisitions, 18 J. CORP. FIN. 1248, 1250–54 (2012).
14. Id.
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million, and 111 of them experienced deal litigation.15 They also found
that shareholder suits accompanied 92 percent of mergers and
acquisitions transactions in excess of $100 million.16 Moreover, about
50 percent of these deals resulted in litigation in more than one
jurisdiction.17 Thus, we find ample reason to believe that more is afoot
in corporate litigation than an abundance of potential wrongdoing. The
combined evidence of tagalong suits, the rapid increase in the
percentage of deals breeding litigation, and the fact that multiple suits
are filed in multiple forums invite the supposition that the explosion of
litigation is driven by the quest for fees and not a rise in fiduciary
misconduct.
The explosion in the volume of deal-related litigation is not the
only suggestion that such litigation is an abuse of process. An
important study by Professors Jill Fisch, Sean Griffith, and Steven
Davidoff Solomon also piques concern. The study closely examined
453 acquisitions from 2005 through 2012, 319 of which involved dealrelated litigation.18 The authors found that amendments of the merger
terms did not appear to increase shareholder approval of the merger.
This is startling because improving merger terms would be expected to
increase support among shareholders.19 The authors also studied the
impact of additional disclosure that was provided through settlement
15. Matthew D. Cain & Steven M. Davidoff Solomon, Takeover Litigation in 2013, at 1–2
(The Ohio State Univ. Moritz Coll. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Series,
Paper No. 236, 2014), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2377001 [https://perma.cc/TSF4-S738]; see also
ROBERT M. DAINES & OLGA KOUMRIAN, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SHAREHOLDER
LITIGATION INVOLVING MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS: REVIEW OF 2012 M&A LITIGATION 1
(2013) http://www.cornerstone.com/Publications/Reports/2012-Shareholder-Litigation-Involving
-M-and-A.pdf [https://perma.cc/5HFW-UBGJ] (“Among deals valued over $100 million, 93
percent were challenged, with an average of 4.8 lawsuits filed per deal.”). For speculation on the
underlying causes of these developments, see John Armour, Bernard Black & Brian Cheffins, Is
Delaware Losing Its Cases?, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 605, 643–51 (2012); Sean J. Griffith &
Alexandra D. Lahav, The Market for Preclusion in Merger Litigation, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1053,
1066–70 (2013); Randall S. Thomas & Robert B. Thompson, A Theory of Representative
Shareholder Suits and Its Application to Multijurisdictional Litigation, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1753,
1788–91 (2012).
16. Cain & Davidoff Solomon, supra note 15, at 2.
17. Id.
18. Jill E. Fisch, Sean J. Griffith & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Confronting the Peppercorn
Settlement in Merger Litigation: An Empirical Analysis and a Proposal for Reform, 93 TEX. L.
REV. 557, 579 (2015).
19. Id. at 585–87. While disclosure-only settlements yielded no statistically significant impact
on negative voting, as hypothesized, the amendment of merger agreements prompted more votes
overall, including more “yes” votes. Id. Settlements that improved merger consideration
produced more observable voting changes than settlements that changed merger terms, but they
did not change the amount of consideration. Id.
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of the litigation. Information provided through settlements customarily
reveals negative information about the deal or qualifies the
information provided by management. Even though the authors
expected that such additional disclosures would negatively impact
shareholder approval, they found only slight evidence of such an
impact. 20 In combination, their findings raise the question of whether
deal litigation resulting only in additional disclosure is socially harmful
because it produces no observable benefits.
We thus see history repeating itself in the corporate deal context,
as we witness another explosion of litigation in a very short time period.
Part I of this article reviews recent trends in deal-focused litigation,
highlighting recent reforms that impact the frequency of suits. Others
have noted that a possible explanation for the earlier rise, and the more
recent ebb, of deal litigation is the ways in which these legal
developments have affected the incentives of plaintiffs’ counsel in
these suits. This Article, while not disagreeing with this assessment,
adds a new perspective on what we witnessed. Part II argues that
corporate norms are at the core of any perceived litigiousness in the
corporate realm. The Article separates the norms into two distinct
groups: “aspirational norms” and “arbiter norms.” While these two
groups are distinct from one another, they share a common feature—
inherent overbreadth—which invites litigation that produces
inconsequential results. Part III probes several paradoxical qualities of
corporate norms. These paradoxes suggest that corporate norms are
more fragile than we might believe desirable, so courts should be even
more attentive to nurturing them. In Part IV, the Article concludes by
examining how to prevent weaknesses in the settlement process from
consuming corporate norms. It proposes that any review of a
settlement must focus on the norm that is central to the suit, rather than
on the settlement’s terms themselves.
I. STEPS TAKEN TO STEM THE RISING TIDE OF DEAL LITIGATION
The most glaring statistic within the deal-litigation data set is that
deals invariably attract not only litigation, but litigation occurring in
multiple forums. In 2012, 93 percent of mergers and acquisitions deals
worth more than $100 million were accompanied by shareholder suits
(the percentage rose to 96 percent for deals exceeding $500 million),

20. Id. at 561.
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with an average of 4.8 suits filed per transaction.21 Although
Delaware’s share of multiforum suits grew from 2009 to 2012, a
significant percentage of such suits spilled across state lines,22
challenging comity as competing forums each jealously regarded their
jurisdictional interests. Invariably, the court of the corporation’s
domicile believes it should enjoy the dominant voice in the dispute.23
The multiforum aspect of the litigation-explosion debate has now
been sensibly dealt with by the prevalence of forum-selection bylaws.24
Since 2015, a Delaware statute25 has authorized forum-selection
bylaws, and such provisions have been judicially approved since at least
2013.26 Though there are many varieties of forum-selection bylaws, the
21. DAINES & KOUMRIAN, supra note 15, at 1.
22. Id. at 2.
23. See generally La. Mun. Police Emps., Ret. Sys. v. Pyott, 46 A.3d 313 (Del. Ch. 2012),
rev’d, 74 A.3d 612 (Del. 2013) (illustrating that a court of corporate domicile, Delaware, cannot
ignore another court’s dismissal of a case, even when the Delaware court believes that the other
court misapplied Delaware law). While the Delaware-based litigation resulted in a dismissal, the
California federal district court was reversed. See Rosenbloom v. Pyott, 765 F.3d 1137, 1141–42
(9th Cir. 2014). See generally George S. Geis, Shareholder Derivative Litigation and the Preclusion
Problem, 100 VA. L. REV. 261 (2014) (describing the preclusive nature of shareholder litigation).
24. The call for such bylaws and their justification was sensibly developed in Joseph A.
Grundfest, The History and Evolution of Intra-Corporate Forum Selection Clauses: An Empirical
Analysis, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 333 (2012), which traces the development and pattern of early
forum-selection bylaws.
25. Act of June 24, 2015, 80 Del. Laws, ch. 40, § 3 (codified at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109
(2015)). Although I recognize the desirability of forum-selection bylaws, I continue to take issue
with the notion that such bylaw provisions are contractually based. Although the statute in
Delaware now authorizes such provisions, that statute only applies to Delaware corporations,
does not directly address the propriety—let alone the wisdom—of the board unilaterally initiating
a provision that changes a long-standing feature of the shareholder franchise, and it does not
address other bylaw initiatives that boards may undertake that intrude on prerogatives of the
shareholders. See James D. Cox, Corporate Law and the Limits of Private Ordering, 93 WASH. U.
L. REV. 257, 290–91 (2015). And the question of consent related to the board’s unilateral adoption
of such a provision is questionable. See Deborah A. DeMott, Forum-Selection Bylaws Refracted
Through an Agency Lens, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 269, 274–75 (2015) (explaining that a grant of
authority to a board to amend bylaws is too attenuated for shareholders to expect that the
authority would be exercised to change the rules by which shareholder suits can be maintained);
Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Consent in Corporate Law, 70 BUS. LAW. 161, 168–73 (2014)
(explaining that consent is central to governance so that such a bylaw provision is vulnerable on
this requirement). Indeed, a board’s unilateral adoption of such a sensible provision raises
important governance questions flowing from why the board did not seek shareholder approval.
26. Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 942−43, 963 (Del. Ch.
2013). An important impetus for the widespread early adoption of forum-selection bylaws was
dicta provided by Vice Chancellor Laster. See In re Revlon, Inc. S’holders Litig., 990 A.2d 940,
960 (Del. Ch. 2010) (“[I]f boards of directors and stockholders believe that a particular forum
would provide an efficient and value-promoting locus for dispute resolution, then corporations
are free to respond with charter provisions selecting an exclusive forum for intra-entity
disputes.”).
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most common provision reflects a preference for the forum of the state
of incorporation27 while also according the board of directors authority
to “waive” the selected forum in favor of another forum where a suit is
pending.28
Another significant development is a 2016 Delaware decision, In
re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litigation,29 which confronted concerns
associated with the rise of disclosure-only settlements. The court
established a new and heightened standard by which “disclosure-only
settlements” are evaluated.30 The previously well-established standard
in Delaware for judicial review of settlements inquired broadly into
“the reasonableness of the ‘give’ and the ‘get’”31 when evaluating the
claim and possible defenses. But in Trulia, Inc., Chancellor Bouchard
aimed squarely at the concerns captured in the data examined by Fisch,
Griffin, and Davidoff Solomon, holding that disclosure-only
settlements must satisfy a newly established “plainly material”
standard whereby
the supplemental disclosures address a plainly material
misrepresentation or omission, and the subject matter of the
proposed release is narrowly circumscribed to encompass nothing
more than disclosure claims and fiduciary duty claims concerning the
sale process, [provided that] the record shows that such claims have
been investigated sufficiently.32

27. See, e.g., CLAUDIA H. ALLEN, CONF. BD. GOVERNANCE CTR., TRENDS IN EXCLUSIVE
FORUM BYLAWS 4 (2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2411715 [https://perma.cc/Y9CK-YFFW]
(relating a shift from specifying the Delaware Court of Chancery as the exclusive forum to naming
courts in the state as a whole). A bylaw choosing the state court of the company’s principal place
of business has also been upheld. City of Providence v. First Citizens BancShares, Inc., 99 A.3d
229, 240 (Del. Ch. 2014) (upholding a North Carolina designation for a Delaware-incorporated
firm).
28. See Joseph A. Grundfest & Kristen A. Savelle, The Brouhaha over Intra-Corporate
Forum Selection Provisions: A Legal, Economic, and Political Analysis, 68 BUS. LAW. 325, 402
(2013) (observing that such a waiver provision is akin to the “fiduciary out” clause that is
frequently required for contracts and bylaw provisions that can restrain boards from choosing a
course of action that on the particular set of facts is in the better interests of the corporation).
29. In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884 (Del. Ch. 2016).
30. Id. at 891. The broad criteria for settlements is set forth in Kahn v. Sullivan, 594 A.2d 48,
53–58 (Del. 1991).
31. In re Trulia, Inc., 129 A.3d at 891 (quoting In re Activision Blizzard Inc. S’holder Litig.,
124 A.3d 1025, 1043 (Del. Ch. 2015)).
32. Id. at 898. Trulia, Inc. and Chancellor Bouchard join a distinctive line of recent cases
questioning such settlements. See Joel Edan Friedlander, How Rural/Metro Exposed the Systemic
Problem of Disclosure Settlements, 40 DEL. J. CORP. L. 877, 904 (2016) (closely reviewing
numerous recent Delaware opinions that have not only cast a skeptical eye toward settlements
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Trulia, Inc. is a structured response to the malaise among courts
that have increasingly approached disclosure-only settlements
skeptically.33 Disclosure-only settlements provide supplemental
disclosures to the shareholders but do not change the amount of
consideration or other deal terms for the challenged transactions, and
are quite common in suits in the mergers and acquisitions context.34
Indeed, some commentators have even suggested a prophylactic
approach of denying fee awards when only this remedy is extracted.35
Disclosure-only settlements, especially in the context of the dramatic
rise in deal-focused litigation, cast a dark shadow over shareholder
litigation.36 As discussed earlier, the study by Fisch, Griffin, and
Davidoff Solomon found that disclosures provided as a consequence of
settlements had very little impact on shareholder voting. This invites
the question of why suits would be brought to produce a settlement—
disclosure—that is inconsequential.
An irresistible explanation is the well-known problem of
attorneys’ incentives: defense lawyers are eager to enable their clients’
transactions to proceed as agreed, so they offer plaintiffs’ counsel
insignificant disclosures as a small price to overcome the uncertainty of
a trial and the costs of delaying the transaction until the matter is tried.
but many times have either rejected settlements or considered their weakness when considering
fee requests from their counsel).
33. See, e.g., In re Riverbed Tech., Inc. Stockholders Litig., No. 10484-VCG, 2015 WL
5458041, at *6 (Del. Ch. Sept. 17, 2015) (approving, reluctantly, support of such settlements in
light of past precedents, but suggesting the force of the past is waning); In re Allied Healthcare
S’holder Litig., No. 652188/2011, 2015 WL 6499467, at *2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 23, 2015) (rejecting
a settlement with the observation that “in the area of derivative litigation, a culture has developed
that results in cases of relatively worthless settlements (derivative actions are rarely tried to a
verdict) that discontinue the action (with releases) resulting in the corporate defendants not
opposing an agreed upon legal fee to class counsel”).
34. One study found that in 81 percent of the settlements studied that disclosure was the only
result produced in merger cases. DAINES & KOUMRIAN, supra note 15, at 6.
35. See Fisch et al., supra note 18, at 615 (suggesting that because disclosure-only settlements
provide no change in voting outcomes, fee requests in disclosure-only settlements should be
denied and disclosure-focused deal litigation should be transferred to the federal courts).
36. One deeply experienced jurist, Vice Chancellor Laster, laments that disclosure-only
settlements are characterized by their nonadversarial nature, with pressures to settle created by
expedited discovery as well as the deal’s own timetable. J. Travis Laster, A Milder Prescription
for the Peppercorn Settlement Problem in Merger Litigation, 93 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 129, 149
(2015). Chief Justice Strine also emphasizes deal-related pressures adversely affecting the court
or parties’ ability to fully assess the benefits of disclosure. See Transcript of Settlement Hearing
at 1, In re Monogram Biosciences, Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 4703-CC 2010 WL 9044697 (Del. Ch.
Jan. 26, 2010) (“I’m not going to blow up this settlement about [the potential lack of corporate
benefit]. This type of litigation puts defendants in an awkward situation and actually puts
investors as a class in an awkward situation, because of the potential toll it extracts.”).
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Plaintiffs’ counsel, preferring the certainty of a settlement and the
award of fees, accepts the inconsequential settlement. Thus, disclosureonly settlements are an efficient medium for addressing deal litigation:
the defense lawyers’ clients are happy, and the plaintiffs’ counsel are
paid. As developed in the next Part, this perspective could be accurate,
but cannot be assessed fully without a deep consideration of the
underlying norms that are central to the dispute.
Disclosure-only settlements have caused concern because they
frequently provide release of not just claims raised in the complaint,
but of future claims that are broader than those alleged in the
complaint.37 The potential abuse here is in allowing defendants to
escape penalties for their misconduct too easily because of a hasty
settlement by plaintiffs’ counsel. In this regard, note that under Trulia,
Inc., the release must be “narrowly circumscribed” to claims made
regarding the challenged transaction, and those claims must have been
“investigated sufficiently.”38 This is an important contribution of
Trulia, Inc.’s formulation, and this feature of its approach is connected
to the waiver provision that is prevalent in forum-selection clauses.
A fear endemic to multiforum litigation is the reverse auction,
whereby defense counsel wrests a global settlement from one of the
litigants, which leads to dismissal of suits in other forums where
attorneys demanded better terms.39 The Supreme Court entered this
area in Matsushita Industrial Co. v. Epstein,40 holding that full faith and
credit must be accorded settlements, unless it is shown that the settled
claim lacked adequate representation.41 This is a difficult showing to

37. Indeed, this was very much an issue in In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884,
890 (Del. Ch. 2016). See, e.g., Transcript of Settlement Hearing and Rulings of the Court at 12,
Haverhill Ret. Sys. v. Asali, No. 9474-VCL, 2015 WL 3582361 (Del. Ch. June 8, 2015) (“I mean,
the biggest problem I have here is, it seems to me that you got a bunch of very little, and what
you’re giving is a broad release in the context of a company where its corporate governance
doesn’t inspire any confidence whatsoever.” (quoting Vice Chancellor Laster)); see Sean J.
Griffith, Correcting Corporate Benefit: How to Fix Shareholder Litigation by Shifting the Doctrine
on Fees, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1, 16–17 (2015) (“Defendants typically insist upon and receive releases
extending to ‘all possible claims, known or unknown, asserted or unasserted, arising out of or
relating to the events that were the subject of the litigation.’”).
38. In re Trulia, Inc., 129 A.3d at 898.
39. For an account of how a disclosure-only settlement was barely avoided in a matter that
ultimately yielded a settlement approaching $100 million, see supra note 32.
40. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367 (1996).
41. Id. at 386–87 (upholding a Delaware state court’s approval of a settlement that barred
the prosecution of all claims, including those under federal securities law, arising from the same
transaction, even though the jurisdiction for the prosecution of the securities law claims was
exclusively in federal courts).
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establish.42 The waiver provisions in forum-selection clauses allow
corporate counsel to sample the appetite for settlement among
competing shareholder suits, raising the prospect that even meritorious
claims will not be adequately redressed or inquiries into whether there
are unasserted claims will never be allowed. Thus, wresting a sweeping
settlement from an eagerly compliant plaintiff’s counsel can be seen as
purchasing “deal insurance.”43 Trulia, Inc. addresses the reverse
auction by rejecting the settlement’s inclusion of claims not framed in
the complaint. To the extent Trulia, Inc. is followed, defendants are
deterred from shopping among multiple plaintiffs raising differing
claims with the intent of settling all claims with the most compliant
plaintiff.
There is already evidence that growing skepticism of disclosureonly settlements and the ubiquity of forum-selection bylaws are having
an impact on the volume and conduct of deal litigation. In 2015, the
percentage of such suits declined to 87.7 percent of deals over $100
million, and the rate for the fourth quarter was 21.4 percent. There also
was about a 50 percent decline in multijurisdiction litigation from the
2012 high.44 The apparently downward trend in the volume of deal
litigation caused by these two procedural developments is calming;
however, the decline observed may be aberrational and, in any case, a
decline in scale does not eradicate concern that the current approach
nurtures bad settlements. This Article, by discussing how corporate
norms facilitate seemingly inconsequential litigation, suggests how
settlements can better be reviewed to strengthen norms and improve
the conduct of shareholder suits.

42. See Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 179 F.3d 641, 648 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that the state court
had addressed adequacy of counsel when approving the global settlement, so there could be no
collateral attack on that determination).
43. Transcript of Settlement Hearing at 20, In re Intermune, Inc. Stockholder Litig., No.
10086-VCN, 2015 WL 9481182 (Del. Ch. July 8, 2015) (“This is a universal problem. The
defendants want total peace. They do some . . . relatively minimal disclosures, and they buy deal
insurance.” (quoting Vice Chancellor Noble)); see also Transcript of Settlement Hearing at *1, In
re Monogram Biosciences, Inc. S’holders Litig., No. 4703-CC, 2010 WL 9044697 (Del. Ch. Jan.
26, 2010) (expressing a reluctance to “blow up” a disclosure-only settlement because doing so
would create uncertainty regarding whether a value-enriching transaction would occur, given the
ongoing litigation risks (quoting Vice Chancellor Strine)).
44. Mathew D. Cain & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Takeover Litigation in 2015, at 1, 3 (Jan.
14, 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
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II. THE NATURE OF CORPORATE NORMS

Corporate law is but a component of the larger body of
organizational law whose focus extends beyond identifying the rights
and obligations of the organization’s participants; corporate law
embraces governance mechanisms that mediate the different utility
curves of managers and owners and among owners. Because
corporations are now more likely to be formed where there is a
substantial group of nonmanager owners, corporate law is a
challenging arena for mediating the vastly different utilities.
Not all regulation of managers, however, comes out of the barrels
of state corporate statutes and legal doctrine. Incentives arising
through private ordering, such as bonuses that await high-performing
managers, address the objectives of corporate law. Such arrangements
are nurtured by legal rules that accord great deference to employment
agreements. Indeed, the deference that is customarily accorded actors
in corporate law is so substantial as to suggest that much of corporate
law is lawless, except for the latent power of owners to vote their
representatives out of office.
So viewed, commentators question why, given the lax standards
by which officers and boards of directors are judged, we do not observe
a greater number of badly managed firms than we do.45 The answer to
this question is that managers do not live by bread (that is, financial
gain) alone; they act with a high awareness of social norms. Managers
garner satisfaction from doing the “right” thing and avoid the sting of

45. See, e.g., Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law,
Norms, and the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619, 1626 (2001) (arguing that
the business judgment rule is designed and applied to assure that enforcement is almost entirely
nonlegal, resulting in many fewer reported cases of director “malpractice” than in other areas of
law); see also Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?,
44 UCLA L. REV. 1009, 1016–17 (1997) (examining how traditional legal constraints work as well
as they do and making the case that judicial opinions contribute to the construction of social
norms that impact actors’ behavior in corporate transactions). The duty of care is the lens through
which stewardship is evaluated. The obligation of care lacks any substantive content by its
requirement that actors have a “rational,” as contrasted with a “reasonable,” basis for their
actions. In place of a substantive inquiry, courts regularly review the processes employed by the
board to reach the decision, an orientation whose narrative can be expected to have wider
application to practices followed by others than the more focused examination of whether the
decision made was a reasonable one. There is indeed more substantive bite with respect to the
officers and directors’ duty of loyalty. However, with rescission or restitution customarily
prescribed as the remedy for a breach, there are ample grounds to question whether the sanction
is set at too inefficient a level. Nonetheless, if reported decisions are evidence of the prevalence
of disloyal aspiration by corporate managers, the instances of unfaithfulness are quite low.
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loss of reputation that accompanies conduct deemed “wrong.”46 The
level of care by directors, therefore, is largely driven not by a fear of
liability or desire for financial gain, but rather by directors’
expectations of what other actors would do in like circumstances.47
With this understanding of where norms fall within the corporate law
constellation, we can see that the belief system of corporate actors is
an important component of the highly textured realm of corporate law.
That is, the guidance that corporate actors respond to is what they
believe others will do, as well as how they believe they will be regarded
if they act otherwise.
Of course, the degree to which attention will be given to
expectations is proportional to the actor’s understanding of how widely
held a particular norm is. A disputed or weak norm cannot be expected
to have as much (or any) impact as one that is believed to be adhered
to by a significant portion of the relevant social group.48 From this
perspective, judicial opinions have a dual impact. The court’s
conclusions, which usually follow a narrative of the corporate actors’
behavior, signal what practices are acceptable and unacceptable, and
communicate that norms are indeed shared by others within the belief
group.49 Judicial opinions are thereby a bully pulpit for constructing
corporate norms, serving as a central mechanism by which corporate
actors receive social cues.
In this way, courts are important norm intermediaries. Judicial
opinions celebrate role models and define and condemn skullduggery.
They map the straight road that fiduciaries should follow.50 These
messages elevate the norm’s impact. Therefore, corporate litigation
serves functions aside from directly disciplining management
misbehavior when ownership and management are separated. They

46. Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1253, 1259–
60 (1999) (explaining that actors “weigh the pain of shame, the pleasure of conformity, and the
external costs and benefits of adherence and nonadherence” when considering whether to follow
a social norm).
47. Id. at 1263.
48. Id. at 1291.
49. Whether it is the rule that arises or is confirmed in a particular case, or the narrative’s
confirmation of practices deemed acceptable or unacceptable, the result can be expected to
impact the internal preferences of corporate actors. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust,
Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735,
1807–10 (2001) (stressing that the norms of trust and trustworthiness are central to efficient
operations).
50. Id. at 1796–97.

COX IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

11/22/2016 6:54 PM

514

[Vol. 66:501

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

also contribute to extra judicial enforcement through the production of
social norms.51
The role and recognition of norms is especially desirable in
business organizations. The presence of multiple actors in an everchanging environment contributes mightily to the inability of the
parties to protect their interests through contracting. Furthermore,
even though some participants within the organization necessarily
enjoy significant information, the volatile business environment makes
resort to contracting a less than fulsome response. Because parties are
necessarily subject to the bounded rationality of their present
environment, their contracts are necessarily incomplete.52 With the
inability to write “good” or complete contracts, social norms add body
to open-textured standards and can be thought of as providing an
efficient response. In the absence of norms influencing a board’s
action, much of the contract would remain indeterminate and
unreviewable.
In light of both the importance of social norms and the role of
courts in transmitting norms to corporate actors, we should view courts
as norm engineers when they resolve corporate disputes. A holding in
an individual case is important, but it is the end of a sermon on the
good, the bad, and the ugly. To the extent these characteristics can be
supported by references to practices embraced by others, there can be
a stronger expectation that the prescribed norm will be internalized.
This would be the true import of the case.
A. Aspirational Norms
The most ubiquitous norms in the corporate setting are the
materiality standard and the business judgment rule. The former
straddles the federal and state arenas, whereas the latter does its duty
solely in the state corporate context. While the content of each norm is
quite different from the other, they share a common characteristic:
each embodies an aspirational standard, the breach of which does not
necessarily lead to an injury, or at least not one that is compensable.
We need look no further than the Supreme Court’s materiality
standard to understand that it reaches information that would not alter
51. See Rock & Wachter, supra note 45, at 1650 (reasoning that what governs a firm’s
internal affairs and the aspirations of its actors are norms, which the authors refer to as nonlegal
enforceable rules and standards).
52. Oliver Hart, Norms and the Theory of the Firm, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1701, 1703 (2001)
(explaining the many forces that cause contracts in the organizational setting to be incomplete).
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how a shareholder voted, had the information not been misstated or
omitted:
An omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a
reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding how
to vote. . . . It does not require proof of a substantial likelihood that
disclosure of the omitted fact would have caused the reasonable
investor to change his vote. What the standard does contemplate is a
showing of a substantial likelihood that, under all the circumstances,
the omitted fact would have assumed actual significance in the
deliberations of the reasonable shareholder. Put another way, there
must be a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact
would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having
significantly altered the “total mix” of information made available.53

It should be noted that the above quote arose in the context of a
challenge to a merger, so the definition established was very much
connected not only to the explosion of such deal-related litigation, but
also to the findings of Fisch, Griffith, and Davidoff Solomon, as
Delaware is among the states that embrace the federal materiality
formulation.54 The resulting standard, as reflected by the italicized
portion above, deems material many pieces of information that have
no consequential effects on the investor or shareholder’s ultimate
action in reliance on the “total mix” of information presented.
The Supreme Court has fed concerns about overbreadth by
holding that causality in aggregate decisionmaking, such as
stockholders’ approval via a proxy solicitation, does not turn on “the
particular defect in the solicitation materials” but on whether the act
of solicitation “was an essential link in the accomplishment of the
transaction.”55 In both state and federal litigation, this oblique
guidance has come to mean that, when proxies allegedly contain a
material omission or misstatement, causality is determined objectively
by asking whether votes of the solicited stockholders were necessary to

53. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1975) (emphasis added).
54. It should be noted that Delaware, in its initial development of the duty of candor for
corporate fiduciaries, applied a somewhat narrower test whereby the duty of candor mandated
that fiduciaries disclose “all information in their possession germane to the transaction in issue.
And by ‘germane’ [the court] mean[t] . . . information such as a reasonable shareholder would
consider important in deciding whether to sell or retain stock.” Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp.,
383 A.2d 278, 281 (Del. 1977). Later the court substituted “material facts” for “germane facts.”
See Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929, 944 (Del. 1985).
55. Mills v. Elec. Auto-Lite, Co., 396 U.S. 375, 385 (1970).

COX IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

11/22/2016 6:54 PM

516

[Vol. 66:501

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

approve the transaction;56 the focus is not whether any shareholder
vote was acquired because of the alleged misrepresentation.
The operation of the business judgment rule mirrors the
materiality standard, as it too calls for much higher standards than are
ultimately actionable. In this way, the rule houses both an aspirational
standard and a standard of review. The aspirational standard specifies
how actors should carry out an activity or discharge a particular role.
By contrast, the standard of review is the manner by which a court
should judge the actor’s actual conduct to determine whether to grant
relief. The similarity between the business judgment rule and
materiality standard is that, just as a violation of the aspirational
standard for directors does not itself establish liability on the part of
the director, the commission of a material misrepresentation in a proxy
solicitation is not actionable when the outcome would not have been
changed if the correct information were known by the shareholder
when the defendant holds the requisite number of shares for approval
(or for that matter, a material misstatement in a company’s annual
report is not actionable without evidence that it caused an economic
loss to the investor).
An excellent example of the distinction between an aspirational
norm and a standard of review is the Model Business Corporation Act
(Model Act), which sets forth aspirational standards for directors, such
as the obligation to “discharge their duties with the care that a person
in a like position would reasonably believe appropriate under similar
circumstances.”57 This standard is indistinguishable from the standard
of negligence in tort, an area of law in which the aspirational standard
and standard of review do not separate. In contrast, the Model Act
separately identifies the considerations for determining when a breach
of the aspirational standard is actionable.58 Here, a claim sounding in
negligence only arises when “the director was not informed to an
extent the director reasonably believed appropriate in the
circumstances.”59 A circumstance in which a director was reasonably
informed of the facts, but made the wrong decision, would not be

56. See Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1107–08 (1991) (dismissing a
suit where state law required a bare majority of the shares to approve a merger, and the defendant
owned 85 percent of the voting power).
57. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1984) (emphasis added).
58. Id. § 8.31.
59. Id. § 8.31(a)(2)(ii)(B).
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actionable under the Model Act (although it would be in a tort-based
negligence action).
The gap between the business judgment rule and the negligence
standard is explained by the differing contexts in which they are
applied. In many tort actions, bad results are highly correlated with bad
decisionmaking:
In the paradigm negligence case involving a relatively simple decision,
such as an automobile accident, there is often little difference
between decisions that turn out badly and bad decisions. In such
cases, typically only one reasonable decision could have been made
under the circumstances, and decisions that turn out badly therefore
almost inevitably turn out to have been bad decisions.60

As the choices before the decisionmaker increase, as they do in
business decisions, so do the possible outcomes; hence, it does not
necessarily follow that a bad result following the Ford Motor Company
directors’ decision to build the Edsel was necessarily the product of a
bad decision.61 More likely it was the product of a risky decision.
Moreover, within this context, there is a grave risk that the judgment
of whether the aspirational standard was breached will be subject to
hindsight bias.62 This reality in judging the actors’ actual conduct needs
to be balanced against the understanding that in many instances, the
shareholders’ interests are best served by the directors preferring
riskier choices. Thus, the difference between the aspirational standard
and the standard of review furthers the interests of shareholders.
We should also understand that materiality serves goals broader
than protecting shareholders and investors from transactions that will
adversely impact their wealth. In the proxy context, materiality guides
the information reasonably believed necessary to apprise the
reasonable shareholder of the choices before her. Whether we adhere
to the view that shareholder voting assumes importance because it
addresses the “incomplete contract” problem that is embedded in the
“nexus of contract” perspective of the corporation, or serves a
legitimizing function in the “director primacy” view of the corporation,
or is rationalized as the owners’ ability to reward or discipline

60. MELVIN ARON EISENBERG & JAMES D. COX, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND
MATERIALS 625 (11th unabr. ed. 2014).
61. For fascinating accounts of the Edsel’s failure and the multiple forces contributing to it,
see generally ROBERT DAINES, EDSEL: THE MOTOR INDUSTRY’S TITANIC (Atlantic 1994); Tom
Dicke, The Edsel: Forty Years as a Symbol of Failure, 43 J. POPULAR CULTURE 486 (2010).
62. EISENBERG & COX, supra note 60, at 625.
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management through their reliance on the simplifying heuristic of
changes in the firm’s share price, the ritual of voting depends on ex
ante determinations of information the shareholders need to vote.63
Thus, the standard calls for counsel preparing the proxy statement to
include a range of information that is broader than that which would
determine the outcome of a vote.
But why is this so? To answer this question, we begin with the
indeterminacy of a materiality standard that includes only facts so
significant to the objectively qualified investor as to change her vote or
decision to purchase. Similar to the prevailing, more inclusive standard
from TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc.,64 a standard focused on
what would change behavior, would itself be an indeterminate
standard that invites hindsight bias.65 When judging ex post what
should have been disclosed, events that had come to pass would be seen
as having a higher probability or magnitude than would have been
assigned ex ante to the same disclosure item.
The heterogeneity of shareholders and investors can be seen as
calling for a broader disclosure test. It is also likely easier to reach
agreement on the types of information users wish to consider than it is
to isolate items so significant as to change their choice. And the
outcome under either standard can be expected to be context-specific,
a reality recognized by the standard’s reference to the “total mix” of
information. Because the standard is an objective one, the “total mix”
does not sweep in the peculiar information needs of the individual user.
This prevents sampling among investors as a means of establishing a
microcosm by which to discern materiality to the objectively qualified
investors; unless carefully crafted, the sample would not be statistically
representative. Moreover, in a large corporation, street-name holdings
63. Corporate law academics are of course not monolithic; we approach corporate problems
with very different perspectives on what a corporation is and more specifically the content and
purpose of good corporate practices. Building on the work of Ronald Coase, the contractarian
school views the corporation as little more than a web of contracts. Contracting is of course not
costless, and prescience does not exist. Thus, voting is a way of filling gaps in the contract, hence
the view that many issues that arise among owners and managers in the corporation are the
product of incomplete contracts. Academics also have widely differing views on the relative
power and prerogatives of shareholders versus managers (officers and directors). Some favor the
former, being adherents of the shareholder primacy view, while others favor the latter, the
director primacy view. See generally Robert B. Thompson & Paul H. Edelman, Corporate Voting,
62 VAND. L. REV. 129 (2009) (reviewing various theories on why shareholders enjoy the right to
vote).
64. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1975).
65. Id. at 449 (“An omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a
reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to vote.”).
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with a large group of objecting beneficial owners, coupled with the
inherent difficulties of learning the unique endowments of all holders,
would likely not ensure that the sample chosen was a representative
one.
Most importantly, the materiality standard embodies an
important public policy choice of favoring the market in the case of
materiality’s role in securities transactions, or investors’ collective
judgment in the case of disclosures regarding transactions that call for
a shareholder vote. That is, a narrower materiality standard would
naturally cover an equally narrower range of information users, such
as shareholders and investors. The current formulation of materiality,
whereby actionable material misrepresentations are less inclusive than
disclosures that are mandated because they are material, is something
of a social compromise. The compromise provides information users
with disclosures they wish while at the same time insulating individuals
and transactions from legal consequences, except when the
misrepresentation rises to a level believed to cause consequential
harm.
B. Arbiter Norms
The business judgment rule and the materiality standard are
illustrative of corporate norms that are aspirational and exist because
they are believed to best serve societal objectives. Those objectives are
defined by something other than compensable wrongdoing. While this
can easily be said of norms generally, much of corporate law and
corporate litigation (at least in Delaware) involve norms that serve a
quite different purpose: providing a party with a means to involve a
court and thereby obtain an impartial assessment of distinct
transactions. Such a norm is referred to here as an arbiter norm.
The paradigmatic example of such a norm is the Revlon doctrine,
which is implicated when the board of directors favors a transaction
whose structure is such that, upon consummation, it will be the last
opportunity for shareholders to receive a control premium upon
disposition of the firm.66 In this context, the directors’ actions are
subjected to higher judicial scrutiny to ascertain if they fulfilled their

66. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 184 (Del. 1986)
(setting forth the ruling that serves as the progenitor of the “auctioneer” role that directors
assume when a transaction is the last opportunity for the shareholders to participate in a control
premium).
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duty as “auctioneers” of the firm.67 Inherent in the standard is
ambiguity regarding what the auctioneer standard requires. In some
contexts, this standard has been violated by the failure to actively
pursue other bids for the firm, whereas in other contexts, the directors
in the Revlon moment are excused from the need to “shop” the firm.68
What we find in the Revlon jurisprudence is not a model of what
constitutes an auction or conduct appropriate for an auctioneer; we
instead find close assessments of whether the sum of the directors’
conduct is consistent with the view that they acted to advance the
stockholders’ interests.69
A similar lack of definiteness surrounds courts’ reviews of
defensive measures by boards of directors. In Delaware, the operative
standard is whether the challenged action was either preclusive or
coercive.70 Each of these terms is ambiguous, highly context-specific,
and inquired into only after the court is satisfied that the independent
directors approved the action and did so because they believed in good
faith that the unwanted suitor posed a threat to the corporation or its
stockholders. A significant feature of both auction and defensivemaneuver inquiries is that the burden of proof is on the board of
directors, not the plaintiff.71 This allocation of the burden of proof tilts
in favor of the complaining party, at least to the extent of moving the
salient facts to court.
Arbiter norms that today regulate so much of managers’ conduct
in takeovers can be traced to the rich case law surrounding the officers’
and directors’ duty of loyalty. There, the bedrock principle for
addressing self-dealing transactions is the placement of the burden of
explanation and persuasion on the fiduciary whenever the fiduciary

67. See id. at 180.
68. See Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 243–44 (Del. 2009) (reversing a lower
court holding that directors breached their Revlon duties by failing to either conduct a market
check or undertake an auction). This result was also suggested in Revlon itself. See Revlon, 506
A.2d at 180 (“Favoritism for a white knight to the total exclusion of a hostile bidder might be
justifiable when the latter’s offer adversely affects shareholder interests, but when bidders make
relatively similar offers, or dissolution of the company becomes inevitable, the directors cannot
fulfill their enhanced Unocal duties by playing favorites . . . .”).
69. See, e.g., Lyondell Chem., 970 A.2d at 243–44 (reviewing closely multiple steps taken by
directors to obtain the best price for a firm).
70. Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1386–88 (Del. 1995) (modifying the
second step of Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985)).
71. Id. at 1374.
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transacts business with her own firm.72 This principle was easily
transferred to self-dealing in the acquisitions context so that in that
setting, Delaware’s “entire fairness” standard encompasses both price
and process, and just as with classic self-dealing contracts, the burden
of proof is on the interested party. In each instance, the presence of
financial self-interest removes the presumptions that attend armslength dealings.73 Indeed, we can see that just as developments
regarding self-dealing contracts informed the approach to self-dealing
in acquisitions, when the Delaware courts were presented with
defensive maneuvers, they viewed their holdings through the selfdealing lens, observing that directors’ and officers’ interests are
affected by a change of control. The most recent developments in the
acquisition area reinforce the self-interest orientation by focusing on
whether certain governance procedures that are believed to remove
the otherwise heavy hand of self-interest have been followed.74
We therefore see that when the norm of noninterested behavior is
breached, even if only technically, the strong presumption of propriety
that normally applies disappears. If the transaction is challenged, an
“entire fairness” inquiry arises with the burden of proof on the
fiduciary. Stated differently, the consequence of a self-dealing
transaction or conduct that is pregnant with the possibility of selfinterest is prophylactic, as these facts alone provide access to a neutral
arbiter. Not surprisingly, therefore, claims of self-interest abound
amidst mergers and acquisitions, because Delaware mergers and
72. See generally Norwood P. Beveridge, Interested Director Contracts at Common Law:
Validation Under the Doctrine of Constructive Fraud, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 97 (1999) (tracing the
development of the treatment of voidable and nonvoidable conflicts in the context of
constructively fraudulent self-dealing transactions); Harold Marsh, Jr., Are Directors Trustees?:
Conflict of Interest and Corporate Morality, 22 BUS. LAW. 35 (1966) (describing a classic study
tracing the courts’ treatment of self-dealing transactions).
73. See, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983) (establishing, in a
seminal way, the “entire fairness” standard for a parent company’s acquisition of its subsidiary).
74. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(h) (2011) (authorizing the so-called “streamlined
back-end merger” whereby a friendly tender offer that secures a majority of the shares is followed
by a merger with the bidder, without triggering the entire fairness standard); Kahn v. M&F
Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 644 (Del. 2014) (stating that the entire fairness inquiry can be
avoided if the parent agrees in advance to abide by the decision of a committee of the subsidiary
that is truly independent and also conditions acquisition on an uncoerced vote of a majority of
the minority shares); In re Pure Res., Inc. S’holders Litig., 808 A.2d 421, 445 (Del. Ch. 2002)
(implying that the entire fairness inquiry can be avoided for a short-form merger following a
tender offer by a controlling stockholder that increases its ownership to effect the merger when
the provided tender offer and merger price are the same, the tender offer is conditioned on a
majority of the minority holders’ approval, and the controlling stockholder has not made
retributive threats).
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acquisitions jurisprudence is founded on broadly stated concerns
regarding managerial self-interest. Delaware jurisprudence thus places
a bullseye on deals, with the effect of inviting litigation consistent with
the role of the arbiter norm. The result is not unexpected; it is endemic
to the underlying substantive norm.
III. THE PARADOX OF CORPORATE NORMS
Because of their overbreadth, corporate norms give rise to some
interesting paradoxes. By understanding these paradoxes, we can
hopefully make some headway in addressing the costs they impose.
The foremost paradox discussed here flows from the fact that
substantive standards intended to advance the interests of corporations
and their owners by reducing managerial agency costs and facilitating
corporate governance—such as full disclosure of material facts
surrounding transactions—lead to seemingly inconsequential
litigation. Thus, we are confronted by the complaint that well-meaning,
albeit broad, norms merely give rise to another form of agency costs,
namely those arising from spurious suits advanced by unscrupulous
lawyers. As seen in Part II, aspirational and arbiter norms are of
necessity broader than what constitutes culpable, and hence
remediable, misconduct. The purposes served by the norms’ very
existence are founded on policy objectives and practical considerations
that transcend the protectable economic rights of the corporation or its
owners. Consequently, in the space between the indeterminate
standards of each norm and instances of actionable violations, we will
find seemingly inconsequential litigation. This feeds our fears that the
resulting inconsequential litigation is an abuse of process.
One way to address the overbreadth conundrum is to reshape the
substantive quality of the norms. The business judgment rule could be
less hortatory, materiality could be narrowed to include only items that
change decisions regarding how to vote, and deal-related norms could
endow directors with the presumption of the business judgment rule in
all instances. But obviously each substantive constriction of the norm
sacrifices some of the social benefits of that norm. For example, ridding
directors and officers of broad duties of care and loyalty may adversely
impact their other-directedness. A narrower standard of materiality
would produce less information that sectors of the investment
community would find useful. And lifting the lash of possible scrutiny
of change-of-control transactions may yield more problematic
transactions.
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Moreover, this course of action would reduce, likely substantially,
the role courts play and can play in the production of norms. With less
inclusive norms, there would be fewer opportunities for courts to
affirm socially valuable conduct and condemn harmful behavior.
Furthermore, the constriction of their content would make norms less
aspirational. They would become disciplining standards, so that the
benefits of aspirational norms in terms of prompting managers to excel
beyond the minimal disciplinary standards would likely be
compromised.
Three decades ago, states did pursue a reductionist approach to
what was believed to be an overly demanding aspirational norm of
care. They adopted immunity shields whereby directors were insulated
from damages suits unless they engaged in certain forms of purposeful
or self-enriching misbehavior.75 Immunity shields were rapidly
propelled into state corporate law by Smith v. Van Gorkom,76 in which
the Delaware Supreme Court held that directors’ decision to sell a New
York Stock Exchange–listed company at a nearly 50 percent premium
was grossly negligent.77 Coincidental with the decision, the cyclical
directors’ and officers’ insurance industry was at a point of too few
insurance carriers for the demand for coverage that surged after Van
Gorkom; companies then seeking directors’ and officers’ insurance
found both premiums and deductible limits to be high. Thus, at the
same moment that directors of Delaware corporations were shocked
out of their complacency by Van Gorkom, they also found that the
protection they enjoyed through insurance was not only more
expensive but also provided less protection because of constricted
coverage limits. Legislatures acted rapidly to restore directors to their
earlier, blissful life by insulating them from fears that a momentary
lapse would give rise to disproportionately large liability.
Immunity shields, while shifting the focus of corporate litigation,
did not dampen its frequency. Indeed, there are strong reasons to

75. See generally Deborah A. DeMott, Limiting Directors’ Liability, 66 WASH. U. L.Q. 295,
297–310 (1988) (reviewing forms of immunity shields closely). Immunity shields can also impact
the materiality norm because directors who negligently commit a material misrepresentation in a
proxy statement are protected from damages by the shield. Dixon v. ATI Ladish LLC, 667 F.3d
891, 895 (7th Cir. 2012).
76. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985), superseded by statute, DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 102(b)(7), as recognized in Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare Inc., 818 A.2d 914 (Del.
2003).
77. Id. at 874 (holding that the directors of a public company who hastily agreed to sell the
firm without a reasonable inquiry into its value committed gross negligence)
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suspect that a natural consequence of immunity shields is that
directors’ decisions are today subject to more frequent and closer
judicial scrutiny than they were before this legislative development;
that is, an unintended consequence of immunity shields is stimulating
norm production by the courts. If this is correct, we see the ultimate
paradox for corporate norms.
Before Van Gorkom, there were but a handful of cases holding
that directors had breached their duty of care. Importantly, none of
these cases involved public companies; most involved banks. The
paucity of care violations in the long and rich history of corporate law
(and related skullduggery) is regularly explained by the so-called
deterrence trap, where it is reasoned that courts are unwilling to
impose a sanction believed disproportionate to the defendant’s
culpability.78 Translated to the corporate-care case, this means that
courts will not impose liability on directors who negligently depart
from the standard of care, even if that departure is deemed extreme,
when the consequential damages are believed disproportionate to the
level of fault. Immunity shields remove this concern when the court is
asked to review a particular decision.
Immunity shields also encourage, rather than discourage, dealbased litigation. In a former era, an accusation that directors were
careless in their approval of a transaction led to little judicial scrutiny
because of the insulating qualities of the deterrence trap; courts
resisted probing allegations which could expose well-meaning directors
to liability grossly disproportionate to their momentary lapses of
judgment. Following the wide adoption of immunity shields, with their
preclusion of damages, equitable relief has been the common response
to such challenges. We now witness more suits against deals and much
more analysis of directors’ actions than occurred prior to the ubiquity
of immunity shields.79 Thus, we see a second paradox of norms: a
legislative response intended to insulate directors from liability has had
the unintended effect of subjecting director actions to more and closer
scrutiny. With courts freed of the deterrence trap, their production of
norms is richer as they address what is commendable and condemnable
director behavior. This enriches the tapestry of corporate law.
78. Stuart R. Cohn, Demise of the Director’s Duty of Care: Judicial Avoidance of Standards
and Sanctions Through the Business Judgment Rule, 62 TEX. L. REV. 591, 627–28 (1983). For the
view that courts have struck the right balance, see John C. Coffee, Jr., Litigation and Corporate
Governance: An Essay on Steering Between Scylla and Charybdis, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 789,
798 (1984) (arguing that the value of the duty of care is in its “socializing and exhortative impact”).
79. See supra notes 13–18 and accompanying text.
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A further development in the production of norms is how society
subsidizes the enunciation of rights, regardless of any consequential
harm. In an early, celebrated securities case, Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite
Co.,80 the Supreme Court established that a plaintiff who proves a
technical violation of the federal proxy rules is entitled to be
compensated by the corporation on whose behalf the suit was
maintained, regardless of whether any damages were incurred. Mills
alleged that the proxy used to obtain the Electric Auto-Lite
shareholders’ approval of a merger with another company that owned
54 percent of Electric Auto-Lite failed to disclose that all of the
Electric Auto-Lite directors were the nominees of its merger partner.81
Despite there being no consequential damages as a result of the
disclosure gaffe, the Supreme Court established the important
precedent that equity called for the corporation to reimburse the
plaintiff’s reasonable litigation costs when the suit produced a benefit
to the corporation.82 The Court found that establishing that a material
omission had occurred was such a benefit when the proxy solicitation
was necessary to effect the merger.83 Thus, the award of attorneys’ fees
was based on a causal connection between the need to solicit proxies
and the merger’s approval—not the omission itself.84
In Tandycrafts, Inc. v. Initio Partners,85 the Delaware Supreme
Court similarly awarded fees after emphasizing the benefit that the
plaintiff’s suit had conferred on the shareholders.86 Tandycrafts should
be seen as an even stronger embrace of the practice of awarding fees
to the plaintiff when a suit has benefitted the corporation or its
shareholders. In that case, the plaintiff’s suit was brought on behalf of
an individual, not on behalf of the corporation or its shareholders, and
the plaintiff withdrew the suit after the corporation amended its proxy
statement disclosures to address the omissions raised in the suit.
Nonetheless, fees were awarded because the court believed the
corrective disclosure benefitted the company and its shareholders and
because the defendant was unable to establish that the supplemental
disclosure was not a consequence of the plaintiff’s suit.87
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Mills v. Elec. Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 392–97 (1970).
Id. at 379–80.
Id. at 396–97.
Id. at 385.
Id. at 392.
Tandycrafts, Inc. v. Initio Partners, 562 A.2d 1162 (Del. 1989).
Id. at 1165.
Id. at 1166.
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It should be observed that both Mills and Tandycrafts, while
differing in their approaches to causation, require more than the
violation of an aspirational norm to reward the norm’s vindication.
Nonetheless, causality in both cases is so loosely defined—requiring
little more than correlative events—that the vindication of at least the
norm of materiality calls for more than the violation of that aspirational
norm. Indeed, Mills is even more liberal; there, the omission or
misstatement of a material fact alone justified a fee award. In
Tandycrafts there was the additional requirement that the suit must
have prompted some corrective action. The harms arising from the
laxity of either approach are obvious. The Mills decision invites suits
when management controls too few shares to ensure a transaction’s
approval; in Tandycrafts, the hydraulic pressures of a suit threatening
to delay and perhaps scuttle a transaction can force management to
implement trivial disclosures or even procedures as a cost-effective
response to a nettlesome suit.
Mills and Tandycrafts illustrate the central problem in the judicial
production of norms: a weak inquiry into causality in the award of fees.
Even this modest inquiry occurs without the benefit of an adversarial
process, as the quick settlement fulfills litigants’ quest for a win-win
situation: the defendants proceed with the deal and the plaintiff’s
counsel is paid. Their haste to settle not only cheapens the asserted
norm but poses the substantial risk that truly meritorious suits will be
compromised by the weak incentives of the litigants.88
Courts have long lamented that when faced with a settlement, they
are poorly positioned to distinguish between an inconsequential suit’s
expedient end and the premature demise of a valuable claim.89 Thus,
the final paradox discussed here is the fact that poor causal inquiries
surrounding fee awards likely work against the production of corporate
norms. As explained earlier, norm production depends on the court
anchoring the litigation’s outcome in a close analysis of whether the
defendant’s conduct did or did not violate the norm that was the
88. See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications
of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86
COLUM. L. REV. 669 (1986) (examining closely the weak incentives that surround lawyers’
involvement in representative suits).
89. See, e.g., Alleghany Corp. v. Kirby, 333 F.2d 327, 347 (2d Cir. 1964) (Friendly, J.,
dissenting) (“Once a settlement is agreed, the attorneys for the plaintiff stockholders link arms
with their former adversaries to defend the joint handiwork . . . .”); In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder
Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 893 (Del. Ch. 2016) (“Once an agreement-in-principle is struck to settle for
supplemental disclosures, the litigation takes on an entirely different, non-adversarial
character.”).
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gravamen of the complaint. By contrast, the court’s engagement of the
settlement is typically divorced from this norm. Instead, it focuses on
the benefits of the settlement to the corporation or its shareholders. As
a result, fee awards, as currently conducted, have created such cynicism
with respect to the process that they weaken the positive contributions
associated with the underlying norm.
IV. THE PATH FORWARD
There are numerous rulings in any suit. Most judicial actions are
ministerial in nature and provide little opportunity for the production
of norms. Nonetheless, there are multiple moments in shareholder suits
when norm production can occur: motions to dismiss, motions for
interim relief such as preliminary injunctions, demand requirements in
the context of derivative suits, and ultimately settlements. These
procedural steps essentially act as a series of screens that separate suits
along a spectrum extending from the meritorious to the baseless action.
As examined below, even though judicial review of settlements has the
potential to provide rich opportunity for norm production, current
settlement procedures must be amended to fulfill this potential.
The most porous filter is the criteria applied in considering the
defense’s motion to dismiss. For example, in Delaware the complaint
can be dismissed only when the court determines with “reasonable
certainty” that the plaintiff could not prevail on any set of facts inferred
from the complaint.90 Matters outside the pleadings are not considered
in ruling on a motion to dismiss; however, if the defendant moves for
summary judgment, rather than a motion to dismiss, documents before
the court other than the complaint are considered.91 While it is hard to
generalize, norms are more likely to be delineated in summary
judgment proceedings; summary judgment requires the court to decide
whether the undisputed facts show that the directors violated a rule of
conduct. Nonetheless, a review of important motion-to-dismiss
decisions reveals that motions to dismiss repeatedly involve norm
production with respect to aspirational norms, but less so with arbiter

90. See, e.g., Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1082–83 (Del. 2001) (stating that the
plaintiff is entitled to all reasonable inferences that logically flow from the face of the complaint).
The complaint must, however, set forth “well-pleaded allegations”—that is, specific allegations
of fact and conclusions. Solomon v. Pathe Commc’ns Corp., 672 A.2d 35, 38 (Del. 1996)
(describing this standard as being inherent notice pleading). If a motion to dismiss is granted, the
review on appeal is de novo. Malpiede, 780 A.2d at 1082.
91. In re Santa Fe Pac. Corp. S’holder Litig., 669 A.2d 59, 68–69 (Del. 1995).
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norms.92 For example, motions to dismiss are a weaker medium for
resolving self-dealing matters, such as those that arise in mergers and
acquisitions.
As seen earlier, upon a showing of a defensive maneuver or saleof-control transaction, the burden of proof in Delaware shifts to
management to demonstrate it acted reasonably. Because a motion to
dismiss fails unless no reasonable inference of misconduct can be
drawn from the complaint, the plaintiff can defeat the motion by
showing fairly neutral facts, such as the use of a defensive maneuver or
a change-of-control transaction. A leading defensive-maneuver case,
In re Santa Fe Pacific Corp. Shareholder Litigation,93 recognized the
limited space courts enjoy to grant a motion to dismiss. The issue
addressed there was whether the board, in the face of a hostile bid, had
upheld its fiduciary obligations when it placed approximately 16
percent ownership in the hands of a friendly party, adopted a poison
pill, applied the pill in a discriminatory manner to prefer one bidder
over another, and engaged in a repurchase program.94 In denying the
defendant’s motion to dismiss, the court reasoned:
As the terminology of enhanced judicial scrutiny implies, boards can
expect to be required to justify their decisionmaking, within a range
of reasonableness, when they adopt defensive measures with
implications for corporate control. This scrutiny will usually not be
satisfied by resting on a defense motion merely attacking the
pleadings.95

92. See, e.g., Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 711–12 (Del. 2009) (holding that a proxy
which stated that a transaction was approved after “careful deliberations” by the board contained
a material misstatement because the board’s review had in fact been very casual, and reasoning
that the representation of careful deliberation addressed the reasonable shareholders’ concerns
of self-interested behavior); Malpiede, 780 A.2d at 1087 (explaining that the disclosure of the
higher bid renders immaterial as a matter of law any misstatement regarding the board’s rationale
for not accepting the higher bid); In re Santa Fe, 669 A.2d at 68–70 (holding that Revlon was not
triggered because the complaint had alleged that the acquisition was a stock-for-stock exchange
and did not describe the ownership structure of the acquiring firm). Less clarity is more likely in
motion-to-dismiss decisions. See, e.g., Blackmore Partners, L.P. v. Link Energy LLC, 864 A.2d 80,
80–85 (Del. Ch. 2004) (reasoning that one possible interpretation of the allegations that the entire
proceeds from selling the company would go to the creditors is that no other transaction could
have been worse for the shareholders, but it could have been developed at trial that the directors
believed in good faith after reasonable investigation that there was no future in continuing the
business nor any better alternative for disposing of its assets).
93. In re Santa Fe Pac. Corp. S’holder Litig., 669 A.2d 59 (Del. 1995).
94. Id. at 71–72 (reversing the lower court’s grant of the defendant’s motion to dismiss).
95. Id. at 72; see also In re Ebix, Inc. Stockholder Litig., No. 8526-VCN, 2016 WL 208402, at
*18 (Del. Ch. Jan. 15, 2016) (“[T]he activation of heightened scrutiny poses a systemic difficulty
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Thus, in the heightened-scrutiny realm, norm enunciation occurs when
the facts trigger a particular doctrine, as when the acts taken by the
defendant are defensive maneuvers96 or the transaction’s structure
triggers Revlon considerations.97
The “reasonable probability of ultimate success” requirement for
a preliminary injunction98 provides a better platform for norm
production than rulings on motions to dismiss. For example, in
instances of alleged disclosure violations, the reasonable-probability
standard calls on courts to determine whether a disclosure was
required in a specific context,99 in addition to the types of disclosures
that companies need to make generally.100 There are considerations of
the collateral consequences of such an order, however, that regularly
weigh against such relief. For example, in cases where material
misrepresentations are alleged, the general policy preference of
ordering disclosure ex ante rather than determining damages ex post101
is substantially qualified by the concern that an admittedly valuefor defendants seeking dismissal under Court of Chancery Rule 12(b)(6), given the limited record
from which they might draw to demonstrate reasonableness.”).
96. See, e.g., Gantler, 965 A.2d at 705 (reversing a grant of a motion to dismiss and observing
that the lower court overlooked financial interests of directors that supported plaintiff’s claim that
their defensive steps were driven by a motive to entrench themselves).
97. See, e.g., In re Santa Fe, 669 A.2d at 71 (holding no facts were pleaded indicating that a
transaction posed a change of control such that Revlon would apply).
98. See La. Mun. Police Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Crawford, 918 A.2d 1172, 1185 (Del. Ch. 2007)
(holding that to obtain a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff must demonstrate (1) a reasonable
probability of ultimate success on the merits at trial, (2) that a failure to issue an injunction would
result in immediate and irreparable injury before final hearing, and (3) that the balance of the
hardships weighs in the plaintiff’s favor). These factors, however, are greatly impacted by the
court’s concern for the collateral consequences of granting a preliminary injunction that stops or
retards the transaction’s occurrence. See infra note 101 and accompanying text. However, this
preference is substantially qualified by concern that the admittedly value-increasing transaction
may, in the face of the resulting delay or uncertainty of approval, disappear. See McMillan v.
Intercargo Corp., No. 16963, 1999 WL 288128, at *4 (Del. Ch. May 3, 1999) (“The threat of
Intercargo losing its only offer if the Court issues an injunction is real, and it far outweighs the
risks created by denying injunctive relief.”).
99. Hence, when a transaction is stated to have been adjudged fair by an investment bank,
the Delaware court lists a range of collateral disclosures that must be made such as the valuation
methods used, the key inputs into the determination, as well as the range of ultimate values. In re
Netsmart Techs., Inc. S’holders Litig., 924 A.2d 171, 203–04 (Del. Ch. 2007).
100. See Arnold v. Soc’y for Saving Bancorp, Inc., 650 A.2d 1270, 1280 (Del. 1994) (holding
that Delaware law does not require disclosure of unreliable or speculative information).
101. See In re Staples, Inc. S’holders Litig., 792 A.2d 934, 960 (Del. Ch. 2001) (“[A]n afterthe-fact damages case is not a precise or efficient method by which to remedy disclosure
deficiencies. A post-hoc evaluation will necessarily require the court to speculate about the effect
that certain deficiencies may have had on a stockholder vote and to award some less-thanscientifically quantified amount of . . . damages . . . .”).
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increasing transaction may disappear in the face of the resulting delay
or uncertainty of approval.102 Nonetheless, the tension that surrounds
a decision whether to grant a preliminary injunction disciplines the
process and thus sharpens the resulting norm.103
When the action is a derivative suit, the court’s engagement with
the demand requirement—whether the demand is excused for futility
or whether the response to a demand compels dismissal of the suit—
regularly involves the court probing the facts and legal principles in
ways that produce norms. Rosenbloom v. Pyott104 illustrates how norm
production is central to considering whether the derivative-suit
plaintiff must make a demand on the board of directors.105 For years,
defendant Allergan, Inc.’s board of directors pursued a number of
initiatives designed to promote off-label sales of its main product,
Botox.106 Such off-label sales were illegal; indeed, the board had
received several warnings from the Food and Drug Administration
that Allergan’s practices violated the law.107 When Allergan was
eventually prosecuted and paid $600 million in the resulting civil and
criminal enforcement actions, a derivative suit against its directors
ensued.108 The issue on appeal to the Ninth Circuit was whether the
lower court, applying Delaware law, correctly held that the plaintiff
must make a pre-suit demand on the board of directors.109 Under the
Delaware standard, demand is excused if facts are alleged with
particularity that create a reasonable doubt that the directors are
“disinterested or independent.”110 The Ninth Circuit held such a doubt

102. See McMillan, 1999 WL 288128, at *4 (“The threat of Intercargo losing its only offer if
the Court issues an injunction is real, and it far outweighs the risks created by denying injunctive
relief.”).
103. A very different problem confronts the plaintiff and the court when defendants moot
alleged disclosure violations by making supplementary disclosures. In this instance, lacking an
opinion, a norm was not generated by the court, but clearly there is the basis for inviting an inquiry
into causal connection to the suit as well as the probable benefits of the resulting finding. See
Tandycrafts, Inc. v. Initio Partners, 562 A.2d 1162, 1163 (Del. 1989) (upholding the award of fees
in such a case).
104. Rosenbloom v. Pyott, 765 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2014).
105. Id. at 1148.
106. Id. at 1142–44.
107. Id. at 1146–47.
108. Id. at 1140.
109. Id. at 1140–41.
110. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 814 (Del. 1984), overruled in part by Brehm v. Eisner,
746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).
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was created by allegations showing a substantial likelihood that the
directors were liable for failing to act when they had a duty to act.111
Following a close review of the factual allegations, the
Rosenbloom court announced several standards of conduct in the
context of directors’ oversight responsibilities and fiduciary obligations
not to engage in criminal conduct. For example, the court highlighted
warnings from the FDA and an employee’s resignation for ethical
reasons that triggered the directors’ obligation to inquire whether the
company was violating the law.112 By emphasizing that directors can be
held liable when facts indicate that they turned a blind eye to
compliance with respect to a critical product (off-label sales of Botox
represented 70–80 percent of all Botox sales, and Botox accounted for
nearly 40 percent of all Allergan’s revenues during this period),113 the
court reinforced directors’ obligations to ensure that there are robust
and reliable information-compliance systems in place to prevent
misconduct. The court also observed that the pervasiveness of
Allergan’s violations in the face of numerous red flags warning of
illegal off-label sales sustained an inference that the directors “adopted
a plan premised on illegal off-label marketing of Botox”114:
Plaintiffs’ particularized factual allegations . . . suffice to show that the
Board either did nothing despite actual or constructive knowledge of
wrongdoing at Allergan, or knowingly adopted a business plan
premised on illegal conduct. In either case, Allergan’s directors
violated their duty of loyalty and would face a substantial likelihood
of liability; in the latter case, they would also have forfeited the
protection of the business judgment rule.115

This statement, and the effect of excusing a pre-suit demand, are
important affirmations of what is required of directors in discharging
their oversight responsibilities.
In each of the above-reviewed procedural contexts—motions to
dismiss, petitions for preliminary injunctions, and the derivative suit’s
demand requirement—the court’s analysis is anchored in the
substantive allegations set forth in the complaint. This allows each of
those procedures to be a forum in which norms are created. Because
settlements, where so many shareholder suits end, do not share this
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Rosenbloom, 765 F.3d at 1151.
Id. at 1152–54.
Id. at 1142.
Id. at 1158.
Id. at 1159.
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same mooring in the substance of the dispute, they are not nearly as
useful for generating norms.
The facts of Trulia, Inc. are useful in illustrating how norms can be
poorly produced by the current settlement procedures. The complaint
alleged that the directors breached their fiduciary duties by approving
a merger with a single bidder that allegedly failed to obtain the highest
exchange ratio for the shareholders.116 The parties reached an
agreement in time for several supplemental disclosures to be added to
the proxy statement circulated among shareholders; the merger was
ultimately approved by 79.52 percent of the shares entitled to vote
(99.15 percent of the votes cast).117 In addition to agreeing to the
supplemental disclosures, the defendants agreed not to oppose a fee
request of $375,000 or less.118 Chancellor Bouchard closely examined
each of the supplementary disclosures that regarded distinct features
of the valuation process used by the investment bank in its fairness
opinion to the board. He found the supplementary disclosures were not
meaningful in light of all the other information the company disclosed
regarding the valuation process.119 He rejected the settlement, thereby
leaving the suit as it had started: a bald accusation of breach of fiduciary
obligation. Although the right result was reached in Trulia, Inc., the
decision would have been more revealing if the court had analyzed
whether the proposed settlement was consistent with the complaint’s
allegations.
Had the court linked the settlement to the complaint that
established its jurisdiction, it could have further questioned how the
proposed remedy—disclosure of facts surrounding a fiduciary’s breach
of duty—failed to complement corporate fiduciary-duty principles.120
To be sure, a universal feature of fiduciary obligations is the duty of
candor. The director’s obligations, however, compel more than
disclosure. They include an affirmative obligation to act in the interests
of the corporation and its shareholders. The misconduct alleged in
116. In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 889 (Del. Ch. 2016).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 890.
119. Id. at 899–907.
120. Further disquiet over disclosure-only settlement arises from the fact that there does not
appear to have ever been a request for a preliminary injunction seeking disclosure before the
shareholders voted. The record recounts how the parties reached an agreement on supplementary
disclosures without such a motion and, for that matter, without the defense raising a motion to
dismiss. Thus, the defense sought the plaintiff’s cooperation in settling the matter before the
transaction was closed and proceeded to court only after the transaction had been approved (with
the supplementary disclosures the court considered not meaningful).
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Trulia, Inc. was not any want of disclosure, but the directors’ failure to
take steps to secure a higher exchange ratio.121 Because nondisclosure
was not a part of the alleged breach by the defendants, a settlement in
which only disclosure was obtained naturally invited skepticism.
The disclosure provided in the proposed settlement was also
irrelevant to the alleged misconduct because of Delaware’s approach
to the ratification of misconduct. A fiduciary’s breach can be approved
by shareholders following full disclosure, but under the strict equitableratification approach followed in Delaware, any such shareholder
approval must occur in a vote distinct from the vote in which
shareholders approve the transaction, such as the merger in Trulia,
Inc.122 In the absence of a separate vote to ratify the directors’ conduct,
the disclosures the parties agreed to were not a step toward excusing
the alleged breach by the directors. Thus, the court should have raised
another basis on which to reject the settlement: the terms of the
settlement that were nonresponsive to the need under Delaware law
for the shareholders to meaningfully address the misconduct alleged in
the suit.
CONCLUSION
Shareholder litigation is frequently representative litigation, in the
form of class actions or derivative suits. Such a suit’s plaintiff typically
has an insufficiently small stake in the outcome to serve as an adequate
monitor of its counsel. This sets the stage for agency costs that can lead
to inconsequential settlements. And, as illustrated by Trulia, Inc., such
a settlement can be viewed as the efficient and hence desirable end of
the suit by the defendant and its counsel. But this dynamic threatens
the vitality of corporate norms.
Because of both the importance of norms and the frequency with
which corporate disputes are settled, courts should probe settlements
to ensure that the relief provided in the settlement is worthy of the
norm raised in the complaint. In the case of arbiter norms, the issue is
whether there is a self-dealing relationship or type of transaction that
otherwise rids the transaction of propriety and invites judicial review
for fairness. In reviewing the settlement, courts can not only highlight
that which has established that an arbiter norm was involved, but more
121. This point is emphasized by Chancellor Bouchard in his careful qualification of the scope
of the case’s holding. He states that the review standard embraced in Trulia, Inc. is limited to
instances in which the complaint does not raise “a plainly material misrepresentation.” Id. at 898.
122. See Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 713 (Del. 2009).

COX IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

11/22/2016 6:54 PM

534

[Vol. 66:501

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

importantly how the case’s facts align with the arbiter norm and how
the settlement improves the fairness of the process and terms.
When a settlement results from an alleged violation of an
aspirational norm, as was the case in Trulia, Inc., norm overbreadth
poses greater challenges than those present in suits involving arbiter
norms only. As illustrated in Trulia, Inc., courts should conduct a nondeferential assessment of the case’s record to judge whether the
settlement provides a substantial benefit other than bringing the suit to
an amicable conclusion. Absent such a benefit, the court should
withhold its approval. To be sure, courts do review settlements and
frequently do so closely. What I argue is that judicial review is more
likely to be closer to, and certainly more consistent with, the court’s
role of ensuring protection to the shareholders, if the judge views the
settlement through the lens of the norm violations alleged in the
complaint. If instead the review focuses on the worth of new
disclosures or the governance procedures provided by the settlement,
the review steps away from the question of what was proper or
improper conduct and legitimates the process whereby the lawyers
price their willingness to avoid the production of norms.

